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PROFESSIONAL INDIFFERENCE?: HOW ONE CASE
IMPROVES PROTECTION FOR IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN IN UNITED STATES DETENTION
CENTERS
Caitlin Fernandez Zamora* 1
ABSTRACT—This Article discusses the case Doe 4 ex rel. Lopez
v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission. This case was a class
action brought by unaccompanied immigrant children against the
Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission under § 1983 protection
for adequate medical care. The plaintiff class alleged that, among other
things, the Commission failed to (i) provide adequate mental health care
due to punitive practices; and (ii) implement trauma-informed care. The
plaintiffs were immigrant children who fled their native countries due to
harrowing circumstances, many of whom struggled with severe mental
illness. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment regarding the mental health care claim, which the plaintiffs
appealed. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered which standard should
be applied to analyzing a claim regarding the detention center’s level of
mental health care. This Article explores the approach and impact of Doe 4,
as a case of first impression for the Fourth Circuit and effectively for all
circuits with regard to this class of immigrant children. Specifically, this
Article discusses whether the majority opinion followed precedent or broke
away from it in a way that properly embodies federal law and
Constitutional guarantees. This Article also discusses the role of
international law in United States courts, particularly related to protections
for migrants and children. The Article ultimately concludes that the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Doe 4 was correct and explains why and how it should
be further adopted and adapted by other federal courts, to promote an end
to the professional indifference that the United States judicial system has
normalized with regard to care for juveniles in detention centers.

1
* Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2022, LL.M in International Human
Rights, 2023. Editor-in-Chief of the Northwestern Journal of Human Rights, Volume 20. The author
would like to deeply thank her executive team on the Journal of Human Rights for making this article
all it could be, particularly Emma Costello, Rebecca Antony, Nicholas Daily and Taylor Marcusson.
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INTRODUCTION: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK TO UNDERSTAND AND
ANALYZE DOE 4
Information is widespread regarding immigrant children apprehended
at the United States border. News outlets have closely followed the topic in
recent years, with many closely observing and scrutinizing President Biden
regarding his policies for detaining children at the border.2 It is no wonder
the topic is receiving so much media attention, given that the annual
number of unaccompanied migrant children – called Unaccompanied Alien

2
Tessa Hesson & Mica Rosenberg, Explainer: Why More Migrant Children Are Arriving at the
U.S.-Mexico Border, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-immigra
tion-children-explai/explainer-why-more-migrant-children-are-arriving-at-the-u-s-mexico-border-idUS
KBN2BH1BF; see also Michelle Hackman & Alicia A. Caldwell, U.S. Reduces Migrant Children in
Border Patrol Custody, but Emergency Shelters Pose New Concerns, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2021), https:
//www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-reduces-migrant-children-in-border-patrol-custody-but-emergency-shelterspose-new-concerns-11620234355; Priscilla Alvarez, More than 20,000 Unaccompanied Migrant
Children Are Now in US Custody, CNN (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/07/politics/
unaccompanied-migrant-children-in-us-custody/index.html (noting that as of April 7, 2021 there were
over 20,000 unaccompanied migrant children in U.S. custody. About 4,000 of that total were in the
custody of Customs and Border Protection, “an agency not generally prepared to care for children for
prolonged periods,” and the other 16,000 were in the custody of the Department of Health and Human
Services).
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Children (UACs) by United States law3 – apprehended by Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP) grew from 18,622 in FY 2010 to 76,136 in FY 2019.4
In that ten-year period, CBP recorded 434,253 unaccompanied children
apprehended.5 While FY 2020 saw a decrease in unaccompanied children
apprehended – thought to be because of the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic6 – FY 2021 demonstrated higher numbers again, with CBP
encountering almost 147,000 unaccompanied children at the Southwest
border,7 and apprehending over 47,000 unaccompanied children at the
border by April 2022 alone.8 Given the dramatic increase in child
apprehensions at the border, the legal standards which apply to UACs are
of increasing importance.
Alongside increasing apprehensions, recent years have seen an
increasing number of minor children detained by CBP, many of whom are
later transferred to the authority of the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR).9 Once a UAC enters the United States, they are immediately under
3
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (defining an unaccompanied alien child (UACs) as a child who “has no
lawful immigration status in the United States;” “has not attained 18 years of age;” and who either has
“no parent or legal guardian in the United States” or has “no parent or legal guardian in the United
States [who] is available to provide care and physical custody.”). This article will utilize the term
‘Unaccompanied Alien Child’ (UAC) because this is the class of person at issue in the central case, as
defined per U.S. law. The use of this term, however, should not be read as approval of it, given its
degrading nature. The article will also use the term ‘unaccompanied child. While not statutory, is
sometimes used in U.S. government statistics and newly by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).
See, e.g., Unaccompanied Children, ORR, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/uc (last visited May
20, 2022).
4
TOTAL UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN (0-17 YEARS OLD) BY MONTH - FY 2010- FY 2019,
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER CONTROL (2020), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/
2020-Jan/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Total%20Monthly%20UAC%20Apprehensions%20by%20
Sector%20%28FY%202010%20-%20FY%202019%29_0.pdf. The government’s fiscal years run from
October 1 to September 30. FY 2019 ran from October 1, 2018 to September 30, 2019.
5
Id.
6
Under the Trump administration, DHS was permitted under Title 42 of the U.S. Code to “rapidly
expel all individuals without a valid visa or who [were] apprehended between official ports of entry in
order to prevent the spread of COVID-19.” CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11638, INCREASING NUMBERS OF
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 2 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.
gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11638.The Biden administration exempted unaccompanied migrant children
from this order, which is likely why there has been such an increase of children apprehended at the
border in 2021. See id.
7
Southwest Land Border Encounters, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/news
room/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters (last visited June 10, 2022).
8
Unfortunately, the United States Customs and Border Protection page does not have updated
information on apprehensions from 2021, but the total number of children apprehended is certainly
higher than the fiscal year 2021 data going only through March. U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border
Apprehensions by Sector, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (June 20, 2021), https://www.cbp.gov/news
room/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.
9
In March 2021, the number of unaccompanied children taken into CBP custody peaked at a
record 18,951—significantly more than the previous record of 11,861 in May 2019—before dropping
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the legal responsibility and custody of ORR, who is responsible for their
placement and care.10 ORR then decides where to place the unaccompanied
children, with placements varying in levels of treatment capabilities,
security, and confinement. There are a number of placement options,
including a shelter facility, foster care or group home, staff-secure or secure
care facility, residential treatment center or other special needs care
facility.11 The most restrictive placement is called a secure care facility,
which is a restrictive detention center where pre-trial detainees are also
often held.12 This placement is the most relevant to this Article’s
discussion. U.S. law defines a secure care facility as:
[A] facility with a physically secure structure and staff able to control violent
behavior. ORR uses a secure facility as the most restrictive placement option
for an unaccompanied child who poses a danger to self or others or has been
charged with having committed a criminal offense. A secure facility may be a
licensed juvenile detention center or a highly structured therapeutic facility.13

UACs are entitled to the least restrictive placement that is in their best
interest.14 Moreover, ORR only has the authority to place UACs in secure
facilities with a “determination that the child poses a danger to self or
others or has been charged with having committed a criminal offense.”15
Because UACs are entitled to the least restrictive setting that is in their best
interest, ORR faces additional procedural hurdles to maintain a UAC’s

25.3% by May to 14,158 and then rebounding slightly in June to 15,018. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, RISING BORDER ENCOUNTERS IN 2021: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 17 (2022),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/rising_border_encounters_in_
2021.pdf.
10
6 U.S.C.A. § 279; see also Unaccompanied Children, ORR, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/
programs/uc (last visited July 3, 2022).
11
Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied: Section 1, ORR, (Feb. 12, 2021), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/policy-guidance/children-entering-united-states-unaccompanied-section-1.
12
See id. § 1.2.4 (“Secure facilities are for youth who require the strictest level of supervision.”).
13
Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied: Guide to Terms, ORR, (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/policy-guidance/children-entering-united-states-unaccompanied-guideterms#Secure%20Care.
14
See Stipulated Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 17, 1997), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/flores_settlement_final_plus_extension_of
_settlement011797.pdf [hereinafter “Flores Settlement Agreement”] (requiring that the government
place unaccompanied minors in “the least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor’s age and special
needs . . . .”). The protections were later strengthened by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (entitling UACs to
“the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child”).
15
8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c)(2).
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placement in a secure facility, having to reconsider the restrictive
placement every thirty days.16
This information helps give context for Doe 4 ex rel. Lopez v.
Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission (“Doe 4”). Here, the
plaintiff class of UACs were being held in the most restrictive placement
option,17 a secure care facility called Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center
(SVJC).18 The Center is a juvenile detention center that holds both UACs as
well as non-migrant juveniles awaiting trial. The plaintiff class of UACs
detained at SVJC sought to vindicate their Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights in Doe 419 by challenging the conditions at the facility.
They filed a class action20 in the Western District of Virginia under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commission who runs the Center.21 Plaintiffs
alleged Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment violations based on practices of
excessive force and restraints22 and inadequate mental health care.23 The
district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with
regard to the excessive force claims, but granted the motion with regard to
the plaintiff class’s claim of inadequate mental health care. In arriving at its
holding, the court applied a deliberate indifference standard24 to SVJC’s
16
Id. (“The placement of a child in a secure facility shall be reviewed, at a minimum, on a monthly
basis, in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Secretary, to determine if such placement
remains warranted.”); see also ORR, supra note 11, § 1.4.2.
17
See ORR, supra note 11, § 1.2.4.
18
The abbreviation SVJC will be used interchangeably for Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center and
the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission (defendant to the Doe 4 case) which runs the
Center.
19
Though this article discusses both the district and appellate decisions, the bulk of discussion
surrounds the Fourth Circuit’s decision. As such, the Doe 4 abbreviation will refer to the appellate
decision.
20
Doe ex rel. Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Ctr. Comm’n, 355 F. Supp. 3d 454 (W.D. Va.
2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe 4 ex rel. Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Ctr. Comm’n,
985 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2021). Because of the transient nature of UAC treatment and SVJC’s care, the
certification process took some time. The class was eventually certified, but the time expended for the
process allowed for further incidents of alleged inadequate health care to occur at the defendant facility,
SVJC.
21
See id. at 458-59.
22
The Fourth Circuit only considered the mental health claim on appeal because, after the district
court granted partial summary judgment, the plaintiff class abandoned all claims other than the mental
health care claim, appealing only with regard to that claim. See 985 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2021), cert.
denied sub nom. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Ctr. Comm’n v. Doe 5 ex rel. Lopez, 142 S. Ct. 583
(2021).
23
See Doe, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 458. See also Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 329; Status of representative is
issue in class action, VIRGINIA LAWYERS WEEKLY (Jan. 12, 2019), https://plus.lexis.com/document/
index?crid=297ef86b-4a70-46e5-a09f-952f9744183c&pdpermalink=94331ee5-aacb-4557-9f81-e14092
827f02&pdmfid=1530671&pdisurlapi=true&cbc=0.
24
For more discussion of the legal deliberate indifference standard and its application, see infra
note 43 and accompanying text.
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provision of medical treatment to UACs in its care,25 meaning that SVJC
would only be liable if the plaintiffs could prove that its officials had actual
knowledge of UACs’ serious medical needs and then disregarded those
needs.26
Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the Western District of Virginia’s
decision regarding SVJC’s provision of medical care. Their appeal was
considered by the Fourth Circuit in January 2021. The Fourth Circuit
addressed two questions in ruling on the plaintiffs’ appeal: (1) did the class
have standing to sue SVJC, when ultimately a different state agency (ORR)
was responsible for the well-being of the UACs making up the plaintiff
class,27 and (2) what is the appropriate standard to apply in determining
whether a detention center holding UACs has provided adequate medical
care?28 As a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit approached the
issue of which standard should apply to claims of inadequate medical care
for UACs, with a majority of the Fourth Circuit panel deciding that the
standard should be one of professional judgment, rather than the more
deferential standard of deliberate indifference29 used by the district court.
The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Doe 4 is timely given the increasing
number of migrant children detained, because it strengthens the
constitutional rights of UACs.30
Because the Western District of Virginia applied an improper standard
to the facts, the court excluded key evidence material to the summary
judgment determination.31 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court’s summary judgment ruling. On July 9, 2021,
defendant SVJC filed a petition for writ of certiorari, requesting review by
the Supreme Court, which was denied on December 6, 2021.32 As of this

25

See Doe ex rel. Lopez, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 468-69.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1994).
27
SVJC argued that, by failing to name ORR as a defendant, plaintiffs failed to meet the
requirements of redressability and therefore had no standing. Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 337. The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument, finding that: “[b]ecause [plaintiff]s’ proposed remedy focuses on the
treatment and services provided by SVJC, [plaintiffs] seek relief likely to redress their injuries,”
Plaintiffs met the requirements for redressability. Id. Thus, Plaintiffs had standing. Id. This article will
not discuss the matter of standing further, but expresses support for this reading of standing, which
promotes the ability of detained immigrant juveniles – and vulnerable populations in general – to seek
remedy for unconstitutional conditions and harms.
28
Discussed infra Section II.
29
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 349 (discussing a time when the Supreme Court applied a “less deferential”
professional judgment standard, in lieu of the more deferential deliberate indifference standard).
30
See supra note 2.
31
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 346-47.
32
Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n v. Doe 5 ex rel. Lopez, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
26
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writing, the case is still awaiting remand, and therefore the plaintiff class is
still awaiting relief.
The majority also spent a portion of its opinion discussing how
developments in trauma-informed care inform professional judgment
regarding adequate mental health care.33 The Court defined a traumainformed system of care as one that “provides an environment in which
youth feel safe, are assisted in coping when past traumatic experiences are
triggered, and in which exposure to potentially retraumatizing reminders or
events is reduced.”34 To understand this portion of the opinion, it is
important to appreciate the context of trauma-informed care as a relatively
recent development in healthcare. From 1995-1997 the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) conducted what became a groundbreaking study on the
effects of childhood trauma.35 The study showed that there were significant
links between childhood trauma, or “Adverse Childhood Experiences”
(ACEs), and increased risk of death and delinquency.36 Since this
discovery, Congress has recognized trauma as a public health crisis37 and
various groups – including state and federal government actors – have
discussed and implemented standards for child health care to better address
the effects of trauma.38
Trauma-informed care is salient to Doe 4 because UACs are a
vulnerable class. Many UACs have experienced trauma in their lifetime,
which is one of the many disadvantages UACs face. UACs experience
additional vulnerability due to their status as migrants and children.
Because UACs are unaccompanied, they are put in the care of ORR.
Instead of having parents or close family advocating for them, UACs have
only ORR. It is unsurprising, then, that doctors have noted that
33

See infra Section III for a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinions on trauma-informed
care and the proper legal analysis for children in detention.
34
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 344.
35
Anda et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many of the
Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 245 (1988); see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Violence
Prevention: CDC-Kaiser ACE Study (Apr. 6, 2021) https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/aces/
about.html.
36
Anda et al., supra note 35, at 245; see also Kadee Atkinson & Phelan Wyrick, Examining the
Relationship Between Childhood Trauma and Involvement in the Justice System, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.
J., Oct. 2021, at 1 (“Trauma experienced during childhood may result in profound and long-lasting
negative effects [such as] delinquency and adult criminality, substance abuse, poor school performance,
depression, and chronic disease.”) (citing several studies and articles from 1998 through 2020).
37
Identifying, Preventing, and Treating Childhood Trauma: Pervasive Public Health Issue that
Needs Greater Federal Attention, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Reform 116 Cong.
(2019), https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/identifying-preventing-and-treating-childhoodtrauma-a-pervasive-public-health.
38
See, e.g., infra notes 198-200.
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unaccompanied migrant children are more disadvantaged than
accompanied migrant children.39 Additionally, UACs often undergo
procedures in the United States without giving proper consent.40 In order to
understand how domestic courts should analyze the rights of UACs, one
must recognize the legal protections afforded to UACs due to their status as
children, their status as migrants (often as refugees or asylum seekers), and
their unique medical situations owing to the impact of trauma on their lives.
This Article recognizes how judicial standards of review, in their
current state, result in a professional indifference towards the amount of
mental health care provided to children and vulnerable groups while in
detention. Despite this, this Article takes the position that Doe 4 is a small
step in the right direction, recognizing how an especially vulnerable group
is entitled to a stricter standard of review regarding their medical care. This
Article begins by providing background on the current state of the law
regarding plaintiffs as detainees, refugees, and children,41 and then conducts
an in-depth analysis of the majority’s holding and dissent’s concerns in
Doe 4, considering the potential impact of international law and precedent
upon the subject matter. Section I reviews the legal history behind a
detainee’s right to medical care in the United States and notes special
protections for vulnerable populations such as refugees, asylum seekers,
and children. Section II discusses the holding in Doe 4, namely that the
relevant standard for a § 1983 claim brought by UACs based on inadequate
mental healthcare is one of professional judgment, rather than deliberate
indifference. Section II also addresses concerns voiced by the dissent in
Doe 4. Section III examines how trauma-informed care is relevant to the
professional judgment standard. Section IV highlights how international
law would interpret Doe 4, and suggests how this interpretation could and
should affect domestic law. Lastly, Section V concludes with
recommendations for courts moving forward, in light of both Doe 4 and
additional policy considerations discussed here.

39
Giselle Malina, How Should Unaccompanied Minors in Immigration Detention be Protected
From Coercive Medical Practices?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS 603, 606 (2019).
40
Id.
41
When it comes to Constitutional rights, the case law has largely treated prisoner’s rights and
detainees of any other sort as equal. C.f. Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 335 (noting that courts have repeatedly
applied the deliberate indifference standard to civil detainees, which includes immigrant detainees). In
some cases, certain detainees have been awarded additional safeguards. The professional judgment
standard is such an additional safeguard which applies only to a limited number of detainees, not to
prisoners. Since Doe 4 and the putative class are not prisoners, rather detained UACs, this article will
use the term ‘detainee’ when discussing the plaintiff class throughout, though prisoner and detainee
may otherwise be used interchangeably.
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ELEVATED PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN GROUPS

The plaintiff class in Doe 4 is unique because it is comprised of a
group with three intersecting identities, namely, (1) detainees, (2) migrants,
and (3) children. This section therefore reviews a brief history of a
detainee’s right to medical care and discusses the extra protections
provided to migrants and children under domestic and international law.
This background is important for understanding how domestic and
international law applies to the plaintiff class in Doe 4. In reaching its
holding, the majority primarily discussed the detainee aspect of UACs’
identities, somewhat glossing over their status as children and largely
ignoring their status as migrants. Despite the Court’s approach, this Article
argues that all three identities are crucial to a proper analysis of Doe 4 and
a UAC’s right to adequate mental health care.
A. Development of a Detainee’s Right to Medical Care
In 1973, the American Medical Association conducted a study of U.S.
jails, finding that: “25% had no medical facilities whatsoever; 65.5% had
first aid as the only medical care available; 28% had no regular sick call;
and 11.4% did not have a physician on call.”42 This lack of care was likely
due to the fact precedent previously supported the notion that as “a general
matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive
services for those within its borders.”43 Recognizing this deficiency,
common law developed to recognize that “[w]hen a person is
institutionalized – and wholly dependent on the State,” the State has “a
duty to provide certain services and care,” though the State is allowed
“considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its
responsibilities.”44
The 1976 Supreme Court decision, Estelle v. Gamble,45 was grounded
in this same reasoning: prisoners should be entitled to adequate medical
care because they are not free to select the provider or care they prefer.46
Estelle held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
42
William J. Rold, Thirty Years After Estelle v. Gamble: A Legal Retrospective, 14 J. CORR.
HEALTH CARE 11, 17 (2008) (citing STEINWALD & ALEVIZOS, AMA, MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS - A
1972 AMA SURVEY (1973)).
43
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318
(1980) (denying that the government has an affirmative duty to secure publicly funded abortions);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (same, for medical treatment).
44
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317; see also Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1971);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970).
45
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
46
Eric Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standards for Prison
Health Care, 63 VA L. REV. 921, 938 (1977).
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prisoner[s] constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” under the
Eighth Amendment, and therefore deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs forms a cause of action for prisoners under § 1983.47 Even
before Estelle, in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court stated that the
Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”48 Then, in Estelle,
the Court applied the same concept to a prisoner’s right to medical care,
clarifying that the proper standard must be deliberate indifference that
“offend[s] evolving standards of decency.”49 Thousands of court opinions
cite this language from Estelle, making efforts to address the ever-evolving
standards of decency.50
The deliberate indifference standard put in place by Estelle only
applies to care for “serious medical needs.”51 This standard requires that:
(1) the detainee has an objectively serious medical need; (2) a prison
official subjectively knows of the need; and (3) the prison official
disregards the need.52 Court decisions subsequent to Estelle have
established multiple categories that constitute deliberate indifference,
including “such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities,
equipment, or procedures that inmate population is effectively denied
access to adequate medical care,”53 denial of care mandated by a
physician,54 denial of care that “is so obvious that even a lay person would

47

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; see also, Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 543-44 (1974) (a
physician’s choice to avoid the more difficult treatment of trying to reattach a prisoner’s ear and instead
stitch the stump constituted deliberate indifference. The court noted that “sufficient callousness and
deliberate neglect on the part of prison officials to [a detainee’s] medical needs” could violate eighth
and fourteenth amendment rights); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (1986) (denying treatment for a
painful condition due to budgetary concerns rather than medical reasons was deliberate indifference).
48
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
49
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50
See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 8 (1992) (holding that a facility may be liable for
constitutional violations resulting from beating a prisoner, even if that prisoner did not require medical
attention. In so finding, the court noted that “the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is
therefore contextual and responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency’”); Porter v. Pennsylvania
Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441-44 (3d Cir. 2020) (discussing the “evolving standards of decency”
surrounding newly understood negative effects of solitary confinement); Malam v. Adducci, 469 F.
Supp. 3d 767, 783-84 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (demonstrating how the Estelle standard must shift to current
events, in this case, as applied to the COVID-19 pandemic and detainment of pretrial detainees with
underlying medical conditions).
51
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
52
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1994).
53
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980).
54
Duran v. Anaya, 642 F. Supp. 510, 524 (D.N.M. 1986).
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easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention,”55 and denial of care
for conditions that “cause pain, discomfort, or threat to good health.”56
The deliberate indifference standard still controls in most facets of this
area of law, applying both to prisoners and pretrial detainees.57 The first
time the Supreme Court used a different standard to analyze the adequacy
of a detainee’s medical care was in 1982. In Youngberg v. Romeo, the
mother of a young man who suffered from severe mental illness filed a
§ 1983 suit against the mental institution where her son was committed,
alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the facility’s
practices regarding its provision of medical care.58 The Youngberg Court
found that the mere fact that the boy was detained did not deprive him of
his Fourteenth Amendment substantive liberties, which typically do not
apply to incarcerated individuals.59 Rather, “[p]ersons who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement
are designed to punish.”60 As such, the Court held that liability should be
imposed only when the decision by the professional represents a
“substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.”61 To date, the
application of the professional judgment standard has primarily been
applied in cases of involuntarily committed patients with mental illness.62
B. Protections Enjoyed by Child Migrants
1. Rights for Children
Children are treated very differently than adults within legal systems,
both in the United States and globally. “Children traditionally have had
narrower legal rights than adults. Until the nineteenth century . . . ‘children
could be sold, abandoned, abused, and mutilated with impunity.’”63

55

Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.1981).
Dean v. Coughlin, 623 F. Supp. 392, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
57
See e.g., Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988); DeJesus v. Delaware ex rel.
Delaware Dep’t Corr., 833 Fed. App’x. 936 (3d Cir. 2020); Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984 (10th Cir.
2020); Chroate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370 (8th Cir. 1993); Hatton v. Paris, 381 Fed. App’x. 445 (5th Cir.
2010).
58
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
59
Id. at 315.
60
Id. at 321-22.
61
Id. at 323.
62
See, e.g., P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1990); Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d
96, 105-07 (2d Cir. 1984); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1467 (7th Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Rabun,
128 F.3d 694, 697-98 (8th Cir. 1997).
63
Elizabeth M. Calciano, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Will It Help
Children in the United States, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 515, 530-32 (1992) (citing D. Kelly
56
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Thankfully, protection for children’s rights has substantially improved over
the last century, as evidenced by the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC).64 While the United States remains the only State globally that has
not yet ratified the CRC, courts have – at least – developed precedent that
recognizes children as a vulnerable population deserving heightened
protection. In holding that mandatory life without parole is an
unconstitutional sentence for juveniles, the Supreme Court stated that
“children are constitutionally different from adults . . . because juveniles
have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”65
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that during youth “a person may be
most susceptible to influence and psychological damage,”66 and “[i]t is in
the interest . . . of the whole community that children be both safe-guarded
from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed [individuals] and citizens.”67 In sum, Supreme Court
precedent distinguishes children from adults in reasoning that communities
maintain an interest in safeguarding children and protecting their freedoms
to a greater degree.
This specialized concern is reflected in the statutory language
concerning UACs. Specifically, the Code of Federal Regulations states that
“[w]ithin all placements, UACs shall be treated with dignity, respect, and
special concern for their particular vulnerability.”68 In order to ensure that
UACs are treated properly once they arrive in the United States, ORR
assumes custody.69 ORR must coordinate the UACs’ placement and
identify and supervise qualified individuals or facilities to care for the
child.70 These placements must be in “the least restrictive setting that is in
the best interest of the child.”71

Weisberg, Evolution of the Concept of the Rights of the Child in the Western World, 21 I.C.J. REV. 43,
45 (1978)).
64
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Feb. 16 1995, U.N.T.S. 1577 [hereinafter “CRC”]. See
infra Section IV for a deeper analysis of the protections enjoyed by children under the CRC.
65
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); see also, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569-75 (2005) (“juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure” and “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult”); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67-75 (2010) (“juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility’”) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
66
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
67
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
68
45 C.F.R. § 410.102(d) (2022).
69
45 C.F.R. § 410.207 (2022).
70
45 C.F.R. § 410.102 (2022).
71
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A).
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2. Protections for Migrants
The broadest protection for migrants, under both domestic and
international law, exists for refugees, although these protections have been
applied to other groups of migrants. Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), a refugee is a non-U.S. citizen who has experienced persecution
in the past “or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”72 This definition stems from the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”),73 to which the United
States is a de facto party.74 States have responsibilities towards refugees,75
and often to a higher degree for vulnerable categories within the larger
group such as children, women, and refugees with disabilities.76 Asylum-

72
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/refugeeadmissions (last visited March 6, 2021).
73
The INA sources its categories of persecution from the Convention, which defines a refugee as
anyone who:
[O]wing to well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. In fact, when
you view the entire US statutory definition for a refugee, it is apparent that it very closely follows the
1951 Refugee Convention’s definition:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (also known as INA § 101(a)(42)).
74
The United States became a de facto party by ratifying the 1967 Protocol to the Convention,
which incorporated a significant part of the Convention. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art.
1, adopted Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The Protocol
incorporates articles 2-34 of the Convention, and requires that States agree to be bound by them. Id.
75
State obligations toward refugees include protection against refoulement (the forcible return of
refugees to the State fled from where they could be persecuted) and similar protections for civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights as a State’s nationals. Information on UNHCR
Resettlement, UNHCR https://www.unhcr.org/information-on-unhcr-resettlement.html. While historically the U.S. has accepted more resettled refugees than any other country, it has not kept up with the
growing refugee population around the globe. “In FY 2021, the number of refugees resettled was the
lowest since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.” NAT’L IMMIGR. F., FACT SHEET: U.S. REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT (2020), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-refugee-resettlement.
76
With regard to children, State obligations and norms are discussed in Comm. on Rights of the
Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005): the Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children
Outside Their Country of Origin, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005). For discussion of State’s
obligations and best practices for vulnerable populations, see UNHCR, A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE PROTECTION AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS (2017), https://www.unhcr.org/
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seekers who flee targeted violence in their home and transit countries are
entitled to the same protections afforded to refugees under the 1951
Refugee Convention.77 In Doe 4, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the
majority of the class member UACs are in the United States because of
violence in their home countries, thus many would likely qualify as
asylum-seekers and receive corresponding protection.78
Refugees and asylum-seekers have several rights under the 1951
Refugee Convention. The main principle of the Convention is nonrefoulement,79 meaning refugees have a right not to be returned to a country
where they face serious threats to their freedom.80 It is the receiving State’s
responsibility to protect refugees and provide them with applicable rights
while they reside within that State’s borders.81 Examples of rights the 1951
Refugee Convention guarantees include non-discrimination based on race,
religion, or country of origin;82 freedom to practice one’s religion;83 rights
of association;84 access to courts;85 and freedom of movement – i.e., the
right not to be detained absent extraordinary circumstances.86
publications/legal/3d4aba564/refugee-protection-guide-international-refugee-law-handbook-parliament
arians.html.
77
Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides for the concept (though not the term) of
asylum, by guaranteeing that:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 73, art. 31(1).
Additionally, Article 14 of The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that “Everyone has the
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” G.A. Res. 217A (1948).
Notably, the U.S. uses the international definition for refugee in order to establish asylum. See
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum.
78
Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2021).
79
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 73, art. 33.
80
UNHCR, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 4 (date)
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees
-its-1967-protocol.html.
81
Id. at 4-5.
82
See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 73, art. 3.
83
See id. art. 4.
84
See id. art. 15.
85
See id. art. 16.
86
See id. art. 26. The UNHCR Executive Committee discussed the detention of asylum-seekers and
refugees in their 37th session in 1986, stating that:
[i]f necessary, detention may be resorted to only on grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to
determine the elements on which the claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal with cases
where refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or have
used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend to
claim asylum; or to protect national security or public order . . . .
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3. Protections for Child Migrants
Combining the dual statuses of UACs as children and migrants,
international law contemplates even greater protection. Most immigrant
children leave their home country feeling they have no other choice:
children understand the grave dangers of the journey to the United States,
yet choose to take the journey anyway.87 The majority of UACs entering
the United States are from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.88 Of
those populations, most children say their reason for leaving their home
countries relates to youth gangs and drug cartels, which may involve
violent attacks by gang members and police.89 Other stated causes include
poverty, poor harvests, and continuing unemployment.90 Girls face
additional challenges of gender-based violence, including rape.91 These
experiences make UACs more vulnerable than average children.
Given the persecution from which most UACs flee, many qualify as
refugees or asylum-seekers; therefore they are entitled not only to
international protections for being minors, but also extra protections under
the 1951 Refugee Convention.92 Refugee and asylum-seeking UACs are
also afforded the protection of United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) oversight. This oversight can be beneficial, as the
UNHCR works to promote ratification for international and regional
treaties that promote refugee rights; advocate for and monitor the treatment
and rights of refugees; and build capacity of and otherwise support national
legislative, administrative, and judicial structures.93

Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) 1986, para. b.
For more discussion on how Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention has been interpreted by
international bodies and applied by States, see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees: non-penalization, detention, and protection, UNHCR (Nov. 2001),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/419c778d4/refugee-protection-international-law-article31-1951-convention-relating.html.
87
Susian Terrio, Dispelling the Myths: Unaccompanied, Undocumented Minors in US Immigration
Custody, 31 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 15, 15-18 (2015).
88
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 7.
89
WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, FORCED FROM HOME: THE LOST BOYS AND GIRLS OF CENTRAL
AMERICA 1 (2012), https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/border_
childrens_report_10-2012.pdf.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
To clarify, only those who fall under the definition of ‘refugee’ are automatically entitled to the
protection of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As previously discussed in Section I.B, however, the intent
behind the Convention applies to all UACs, and as such, non-refugee UACs could be entitled to
protection.
93
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N., https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/un-andthe-rule-of-law/united-nations-high-commissioner-for-refugees (last visited July 3, 2022).
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States can fulfill their increased obligations toward child refugees and
asylum-seekers by establishing procedures to ensure the best interests of
children are realized. UNICEF International has created the following
policy recommendations for how the U.S. can practically uphold the best
interests of child immigrants:
1. Uphold all children’s rights to access protection, to seek asylum and remain
and reunite with family members, while taking public health precautions. This
includes ending pushbacks and forced expulsions of all children without due
process.
2. Strengthen child-sensitive border and reception processes.
3. Prioritize family- and community-based care and case management as
alternatives to immigration detention and institutional care.
4. Ensure inclusion, non-discrimination and equity in care, and strengthen
linkages between the unaccompanied children’s program and other children’s
programs overseen by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Administration for Children and Families (HHS/ACF) to ensure consistent
standards of care and protection.
5. Establish best interest determinations as a core component of the system for
unaccompanied children and ensure that each unaccompanied child is
appointed an independent child advocate.
6. Support every child to participate in all matters affecting him or her,
including decisions related to placement, care and access to services, in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
7. Scale up post-release services, case management and integrated support so
that each unaccompanied child receives continuity of care as they transition to
families and local communities. Ensure that every unaccompanied child has
access to free legal representation during immigration proceedings.
8. Ensure child-sensitive return and reintegration support for every child for
whom returning to country of origin is safe and in his or her best interests.94

These are foundational elements to ensuring the best interests of
UACs and other minor immigrants, representing a start to meeting the more
protective standards of international instruments such as the 1951 Refugee
Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

94
New Approach Needed to Ensure Protection and Care for Unaccompanied Migrant Children in
the United States, UNICEF, (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/new-approachneeded-ensure-protection-and-care-unaccompanied-migrant-children-united.
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II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT STANDARD TO UACS’ CLAIMS OF INADEQUATE MENTAL
HEALTH CARE
With an understanding of the unique rights to which the plaintiff class
of UACs in Doe 4 is entitled – as detainees, migrants, and children – this
section analyzes the Fourth Circuit majority’s conclusion that the correct
standard to apply in Doe 4 is one of professional judgment. Section II(A)
describes the relevant laws and analyzes important factors the Fourth
Circuit considered in coming to its ruling. II(B) then discusses the policy
considerations debated by the majority and dissent. Finally, II(C) briefly
analyzes the impact of the Fourth Circuit’s decision of standard, both due
to the procedure of the case, and given that it is a decision of first
impression.
A. Substance of the Decision
The Court in Doe 4 evaluated the two standards accepted in similar
cases: the deliberate indifference and professional judgment standards. The
deliberate indifference standard requires “(1) that the detainee had an
objectively serious medical need; and (2) that the official subjectively knew
of the need and disregarded it.”95 This standard is difficult for plaintiffs to
prove and gives substantial deference to prison administrations on how
they handle detainees. Consider Perez v. Oakland County,96 wherein a
young man with an extensive record of mental illness – including one
suicide attempt while in prison – was arrested for violating his probation
and brought to jail.97 Once at the jail, a caseworker, instead of a medical
professional, chose to put him in a single, unsupervised cell.98 The young
man hung himself in that cell.99 His father brought the case, alleging that
the county’s policy of allowing caseworkers, rather than medical
professionals, to determine housing for mentally ill inmates constituted
deliberate indifference.100 The district court disagreed, granting summary
judgment for the county, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on appeal.101 The
court asserted that because there was “no evidence that [the] practice [of

95

Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 340 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2006). For an in-depth analysis of this case, see
Daniel I. Bober & Debra A. Pinals, Prisoner’s Rights and Deliberate Indifference, 35 J. AMER. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE 388 (2007).
97
Perez, 466 F.3d at 421.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 423.
101
Id. at 432.
96

255

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

allowing staff other than medical professionals to make housing decisions
for mentally ill inmates] has ever resulted in a suicide or attempted suicide
by another inmate,” there was not adequate foreseeability to meet the
deliberate indifference standard.102 This case demonstrates that the
deliberate indifference standard requires much more than negligence or
willful blindness: it requires actual knowledge of the need or danger to a
prisoner’s health, and disregard of that need or danger.
In contrast, the professional judgment standard is easier for plaintiff
detainees to satisfy. The standard requires that plaintiffs show that officials
failed to exercise judgment within reasonable bounds of a given field’s
professional standard.103 The professional judgment standard elevates
detention facilities’ level of responsibility and potential for liability. Even
still, this standard is far more difficult to prove than mere negligence,104 and
remains deferential to facility administration and the State.105 When using
the professional judgment standard, “liability may be imposed only when
the decision by the professional is . . . a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment . . . .”106 There is a presumption that professionals107
provide adequate care,108 which is why the standard requires a substantial
departure from accepted judgment.109
While a detainee’s right to mental health care is clear, the Fourth
Circuit considered for the first time in Doe 4 which standard should apply
in determining a violation of UACs’ right to adequate mental health care.110
102

Id. at 431.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982).
104
Id. at 324; see also Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 845 (4th Cir. 2001) (“mere departures from
the applicable standard of care is insufficient to show a constitutional violation”).
105
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979).
106
Patten, 274 F.3d at 836 (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323) (emphasis added).
107
Youngberg defines professionals as:
a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at
issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine
or nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care
and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care—including decisions
that must be made without delay—necessarily will be made in many instances by employees
without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 327 n.30.
108
Id. at 323 (“Decision[s] made by a professional [are] presumptively valid; liability may be
imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment.”).
109
It is likely that the manner in which the professional judgment standard is applied does not meet
international standards. See infra Section IV.
110
Doe 4 ex rel. Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 339 (4th Cir.
2021). The majority recognizes several cases that are related, but sufficiently different as to apply a
103
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The majority considered several factors in determining that the professional
judgment standard should apply in this case.
1. Nature and Purpose of Detention
First, the nature of UAC detention is important.111 In the majority’s
discussion of the nature and purpose of the UAC class’s detention at the
Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center, the Court considered Fourth Circuit
precedent, Patten v. Nichols,112 which addressed when to apply a
heightened professional judgment standard for claims of inadequate
medical care. In Patten, the Fourth Circuit applied the professional
judgment standard to an involuntarily committed psychiatric patient’s
claim, explaining that a key factor was “the reason for which the person has
been taken into custody.”113 The Patten plaintiff was in custody both for his
own safety and to receive mental health treatment.114 The Court therefore
considered him different than a pretrial detainee – in custody because they
are suspected of committing a crime115 – and a sentenced detainee – in as a
matter of punishment.116
Placement for UACs differs from the Patten analysis because UACs
are governed by separate laws from citizen detainees, and UACs are in
ORR custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2) clearly lays out the process of UAC
placement, including in detention centers:
. . . [A]n unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services shall be promptly placed in the least restrictive setting
that is in the best interest of the child. In making such placements, the
Secretary may consider danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of
flight. Placement of child trafficking victims may include placement in an
Unaccompanied Refugee Minor program, pursuant to section 412(d) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1522(d)), if a suitable family
member is not available to provide care. A child shall not be placed in a
secure facility absent a determination that the child poses a danger to self or
others or has been charged with having committed a criminal offense. The
different standard. See, e.g., E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing the
standard for adult immigrants detained for enforcement proceedings); A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne
Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004) (addressing non-immigrant children); A.J. ex rel.
L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 1995) (same).
111
The Court spends time discussing Fourth Circuit case Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 840-41
(4th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court pre-dated Patten, however, with the same assertion that the reason
a detainee was detained is relevant to the selection of standard. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22.
112
274 F.3d 829 (4th Cir. 2001).
113
Id. at 840. This mirrors the Supreme Court’s distinction in Youngberg. See Youngberg, 457 U.S.
at 321.
114
Patten, 274 F.3d at 840.
115
Id. at 841.
116
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22.

257

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

placement of a child in a secure facility shall be reviewed, at a minimum, on a
monthly basis, in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Secretary, to
determine if such placement remains warranted.117

The statute which governs UAC placement dictates that UACs may be
detained for only two reasons: (1) they commit a crime, or (2) they pose a
danger to themselves or others.118 While in some ways these purposes
mirror the Patten scheme of custody, there are elements of UAC custody
that make placement unique. First, ORR is clear that its placement
decisions are made according to “child welfare best practices’’ and that
placements put UACs in “the least restrictive setting appropriate for the
child’s needs.”119 ORR also strives “whenever possible” to place children
with special needs in facilities that provide services and treatment for those
special needs.120 Additionally, ORR has even designated a preferred
placement for youth with severe mental health: a “residential treatment
center,” which is a therapeutic setting.121 These considerations suggest that
all UACs, regardless of why they are placed in a secure facility, merit
higher standards of care than ordinary detainees.
The named plaintiff, Doe 4, like many UACs, has a past filled with
trauma and several recognized mental disorders. When Doe 4 underwent
his initial evaluation he was recommended for residential treatment due to
his mental health.122 Unfortunately, Doe 4’s mental health affected his
behavior, leading to several violent incidents at the facility where he was
placed prior to SVJC.123 His violent history is the reason ORR placed Doe 4
at SVJC for months on end instead of being transferred to a residential
treatment center — a less restrictive environment within ORR’s placement
system that is specifically designed for mental health treatment.124 Doe 4’s
rights to the promotion of his welfare and the least restrictive environment
in his best interest, however, did not disappear simply because his mental
illness resulted in physical altercations. In the placement and care of Doe 4,
per ORR policy, SVJC still needed to consider Doe 4’s needs and the
treatment he required.

117

8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. A UAC is detained when put in any jail, prison, or secured treatment center (such as SVJC).
119
ORR, supra note 11, § 1.2 (emphasis added).
120
Id. § 1.2.2.
121
Id. § 1.2.4.
122
Upon being transferred to SVJC, Doe 4 was evaluated by a doctor who diagnosed him with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) based upon
his clinical records. Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2021).
123
Id.
124
Id.
118
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In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson asserted that ORR detained Doe 4 at
SVJC as a protective measure due to behavioral incidents at his previous
placement facility, and therefore his presence at SVJC was more akin to
punishment than treatment.125 The majority rejected this view as presenting
a false binary between security and treatment: “the need to institutionalize
the plaintiff for security reasons [does] not undermine the fact that he also
need[s] . . . treatment.”126 The majority further expounded by asserting that
“[i]f a child is held at SVJC until he no longer behaves aggressively, and
this aggressive behavior arises from an underlying traumatic condition,
then it follows that SVJC’s efforts to improve a child’s behavior should
also treat the child’s underlying trauma that gives rise to the
misbehavior.”127 This same principle was recognized in Youngberg, where
the Supreme Court acknowledged that an individual could be detained for
more than one purpose, finding that the plaintiff had been committed for
reasons of both “care and safety.”128
The Court did not comment on whether Doe 4 was entitled to the
higher professional judgment standard of care solely because he was only
in custody for his own safety and the safety of others, instead of criminal
activity. The law regarding UACs does not distinguish the placement
protocols between these two permitted purposes for restrictive care, leaving
the interpretation open as to whether UAC children who ORR detains due
to criminal activity are also entitled to the least restrictive environment for
their needs and best interests. Given the statutory guarantees that ORR may
only place UACs with entities that can provide for their physical and
mental well-being,129 it seems that regardless of the reason for a UAC’s
placement in a secure care facility, the UAC should be entitled to a higher
standard of care. What is clear post-Doe 4 is that UACs in custody because

125

Id. at 350-51 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 302, 309, 314 (1982) (applying a professional
judgment standard despite the plaintiff being institutionalized because his mother could not “control his
violence”).
127
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 340-41.
128
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 n.27. Indeed, the majority in Doe 4 discusses how both safety and
care are intertwined for UACs at SVJC: “If a child is held at SVJC until he no longer behaves
aggressively, and this aggressive behavior arises from an underlying traumatic condition, then it follows
that SVJC’s efforts to improve a child’s behavior should also treat the child’s underlying trauma that
gives rise to the misbehavior.” Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 340-41 (“For unaccompanied children, [their history
of trauma] often plays a role in the legal and behavioral problems that bring them in contact with . . .
secure placement.”).
129
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A) (“[A]n unaccompanied alien child may not be placed with a person or
entity unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services makes a determination that the proposed
custodian is capable of providing for the child’s physical and mental well-being.”).
126
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they pose a danger to themselves or others are entitled to a higher standard
of medical care.
The dissent in Doe 4 also expressed that SVJC is not a therapeutic
setting130 and thus “is not equipped or staffed to provide the type of mental
health services available in a residential treatment center or psychiatric
hospital.”131 The record, however, shows that SVJC requires input from a
mental health professional when placing children at its facilities. As part of
that process, SVJC has “mental health clinicians evaluate prospective
referrals to see if their facility can meet those children’s mental health
needs.”132 Those same medical professionals then have the power to decline
the referral for the child if they believe SVJC cannot provide adequate
care.133 This process demonstrates that SVJC assumes responsibility for the
mental health of the children it accepts, and confirms the intent and ability
of SVJC to treat those children’s needs.134
Lastly, the dissent asserted that SVJC should not be subject to the
professional judgment standard because it is not intended for long-term
detention.135 The length of a detention, however, is not dispositive of which
standard should apply. In fact, Patten acknowledged that “some
involuntarily committed patients are confined for short periods of time.”136
2. Balance of Interests Between State and Child
Another factor weighed by the Doe 4 Court was the balance of
interests between the State and the child.137 The Court relied heavily on its
own estimation that the plaintiff class may have been subjected to
violations of both their constitutional and statutory rights, given the federal

130

Like a residential treatment center, or a hospital. Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 341.
Id. at 351.
132
Id. at 341.
133
Id.
134
Id. As the majority notes:
SVJC has various methods to care for mental illness: each child receives a case manager and a
licensed mental health clinician, residents have weekly meetings with their clinician, and twiceweekly 5-15 minute large group sessions. SVJC also has a psychiatrist, Dr. Timothy Kane, who
visits the facility every three to six weeks. Dr. Kane does not counsel or provide psychotherapy,
however, instead he prescribes medications. Despite the services it offers, SVJC acknowledges that
the facility does not have “the internal capacity to deal effectively with the needs of unaccompanied
kids who have severe mental illness” because it lacks the treatment capabilities of “a residential
treatment center or hospital.” For example, it does not offer prolonged exposure therapy to treat
PTSD because its clinicians are not qualified to offer such treatment.
Id. at 330-31.
135
Id. at 351.
136
Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 841 (4th Cir. 2001).
137
Id. at 836.
131
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protection in place for UACs.138 Section 1983139 provides a remedy for
violations of rights delineated in the Constitution and federal laws.140 UACs
have several statutory rights outside the Constitution, including the right to
be “treated with dignity, respect, and special concern for their particular
vulnerability.”141 Furthermore, if it is necessary for ORR to place a UAC in
a supervised facility, their statutory rights dictate that it must be a facility
qualified to provide for their physical and mental needs142 and their “best
interest.”143
Ordinarily, when determining if there was a Fourteenth Amendment
violation of a detainee’s rights, a court must balance the detainee’s “liberty
interests against the relevant state interests.”144 For UACs, however, the
balance must not be against a detainee’s general liberty interests, but rather
against his or her best interests and in light of his or her particular
vulnerability, due to the extra guarantees federal law extends to UACs.145
The backdrop for these statutes comes from a 1993 Supreme Court case,
and subsequent settlement, Reno v. Flores.146 In that case, a class of
children that INS detained147 challenged a blanket policy which required
INS to detain migrant juveniles pending deportation proceedings.148 The
policy only allowed release to adult relatives or guardians living in the
United States, but not to other willing and responsible adults.149 The Court
ruled for INS, placing heavy emphasis on the noncitizen status of the
children as a reason to grant them fewer rights than would be applied to
citizens.150 Despite this ultimate holding, however, the Supreme Court also
stated that the best interest of a child is a relevant criterion to weigh against

138

See 45 C.F.R. § 410 (2022).
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
140
Elsewhere referred to as “laws of the United States.” See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
141
45 C.F.R. § 410.102(d).
142
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A) (“[A]n unaccompanied alien child may not be placed with a person or
entity unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services makes a determination that the proposed
custodian is capable of providing for the child’s physical and mental well-being.”); 45 C.F.R.
§ 410.102.
143
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A).
144
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
145
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A).
146
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
147
United Immigration and Naturalization Service is now “USCIS,” which stands for U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services.
148
Reno, 507 U.S. at 292.
149
Id. at 304.
150
Id.
139
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other legitimate government interests.151 Importantly, the holding in Reno v.
Flores was overshadowed by the Flores Settlement Agreement,152 which the
parties reached only four years later and would form the basis for current
UAC rights.
The dissent in Doe 4 addressed the “best interests of the child”
language, arguing that the Supreme Court rejected use of such language as
a standard in Reno v. Flores.153 This argument misunderstands Reno,
however, which did not cast aside a child’s “best interest” but rather
asserted that the best interests of children is not the only relevant criterion
when ruling on the government’s exercise of its custodial responsibilities.154
Moreover, the extent to which Reno influences Doe 4 is limited in light of
the Flores Settlement Agreement. The agreement in many ways
controverted the findings of the Court by broadening the category of adults
to whom immigrant children could be released and establishing
immigration policies to ensure juveniles’ well-being and best interests.155
The Agreement is an example of successful pushback against a judiciary
that saw immigration enforcement as a greater priority than the rights of
immigrant children.156 The Flores Settlement Agreement, along with the
various federal statutes it influenced, still largely governs the treatment of
UACs.157 This history serves as a signal to courts that immigrant children
are not afforded fewer rights than citizens, but rather enjoy additional
protections due to their vulnerable status. Because heightened
considerations for UACs go beyond those granted to involuntarily
committed persons – the original group whose inadequate care claims
merited application of the professional judgment standard in Youngberg –
the Fourth Circuit was correct in applying at least as stringent a standard
for the care of UACs.
151
Cf. id. (“‘The best interests of the child’ is likewise not an absolute and exclusive constitutional
criterion for the government’s exercise of the custodial responsibilities that it undertakes, which must be
reconciled with many other responsibilities.”).
152
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 14.
153
Id. at 350 (citing Reno, 507 U.S. at 292).
154
Reno, 507 U.S. at 303-04.
155
Olga Byrne, Promoting a Child Rights-Based Approach to Immigration in the United States,
32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 59, 84 (2017); see also Office of the Inspector General, Unaccompanied
Juveniles in INS Custody, D EP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 28, 2001), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/INS/e0109/
exec.htm.
156
Byrne, supra note 155 at 70-71; see, e.g., Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 11
(requiring that the government place unaccompanied minors in “the least restrictive setting appropriate
to the minor’s age and special needs . . . .”); id. ¶ 12A (when UACs are detained, it should be in “safe
and sanitary” facilities, separate from adults); id. ¶ 24A (alien minors not released from detention are
entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge).
157
KELSEY Y. SANTAMARIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11799, CHILD MIGRANTS AT THE BORDER:
THE FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND OTHER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS (2021).

262

20:239 (2022)

Professional Indifference?

B. Policy Considerations Discussed by the Fourth Circuit
1. Substantive Due Process
The majority found that the due process rights of the plaintiff class of
UACs in Doe 4 were properly upheld by the professional judgment
standard. This is because Plaintiffs asserted a fundamental right: the right
to adequate medical care while in government custody.158 Because this right
is covered under a substantive due process analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the majority argues, the decision for the Court is only “what
measurement of culpability to use to determine when an unaccompanied
child has been deprived of that fundamental right.”159
The Doe 4 dissent argued that the majority erred in applying the
professional judgment standard, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s
historical treatment of standards in substantive due process cases.160 The
dissent cited an opinion in which the Supreme court expressed concerns
with expanding substantive due process surrounding physician-assisted
suicide, “because guideposts for responsible decision-making in [that]
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”161 This does not apply to Doe
4. While it may be possible to argue that mental health lacked sufficient
guideposts in the past, that is no longer the case. Data and cultural
understanding have shifted to create a wealth of knowledge surrounding
mental health and treatment,162 and courts have repeatedly been asked to
determine matters regarding adequate levels of mental health-care or
mental illness and incarcerated individuals;163 thus, the judiciary may no
longer call mental health “uncharted” territory. Given the large percentage
of current detainees and inmates dealing with mental illness – 54% of state
prisoners and 45% of federal prisoners – courts should be familiar with and

158
See Doe 4 ex rel. Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 338 (4th Cir.
2021) (holding that DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
established that adequate medical care in government custody is a fundamental right).
159
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 341.
160
Id. at 349-50.
161
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD
L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 323-26 (5th ed. 2019).
162
One need not look further than the several amici briefs regarding mental health conditions,
treatments and trauma-informed care filed for the court in Doe 4. Additionally, the very existence of the
government’s declared Mental Health Awareness Month (May) demonstrates that this issue is
understood to be pressing and pervasive. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 10193, 86 Fed. Reg. 23, 981.
163
There are 71,899 federal cases discussing mental health or mental healthcare on LexisNexis, not
including any state cases. 336 of those cases are opinions of the Supreme Court. Search for Mental
Health or Mental Health-Care, LEXISNEXIS, http://plus.lexis.com (search field for “‘mental health’ OR
‘mental health-care’” then select the drop down titled “Court”).
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comfortable addressing the interplay between mental illness and
incarceration.164
2. Federalism
The dissent started its discussion of federalism by likening Doe 4 to
“institutional reform” cases, which “often raise sensitive federalism
concerns.”165 Relying on the Supreme Court’s determination that states
have a strong interest in regulating the administration of their prisons,166 the
dissent extrapolated that “states have a similarly strong interest in being
able to design and manage their juvenile detention systems in a manner free
from federal judicial fine-tuning.”167 The dissent’s federalism argument
fails to recognize that facilities take on UACs knowing that UACs are
specially protected by a federal agency (ORR) and federal law. The
Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center is owned and operated by Shenandoah
Valley Juvenile Commission which operates in several counties and cities
within Virginia.168 SVJC is not a federal facility, but rather a state facility
owned by a public regional commission, which falls within the oversight of
the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice.169 Though SVJC is a state
facility, it must uphold detainee’s constitutional rights and the additional
statutory requirements regarding UAC care. In fact, SVJC’s responsibilities
are partially outlined in their Cooperation Agreement with ORR, where it
agrees to house UACs until they are transferred to a different placement by
ORR or until they reach majority.170 SVJC is thus bound by its own
agreement to uphold ORR’s standards for the UACs it holds. Additionally,
the services SVJC provides to UACs must comply with “State residential
care licensing requirements, the Flores settlement agreement, pertinent
164
Lorna Collie, Incarceration Nation: The United States Leads the World in Incarceration. A New
Report Explores Why — and Offers Recommendations for Fixing the System, 45 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 56
(2014), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration (“Mental illness among today’s inmates
is . . . pervasive, with 64 percent of jail inmates, 54 percent of state prisoners and 45 percent of federal
prisoners reporting mental health concerns, the report found. Substance abuse is also rampant and often
co-occurring.”); see also DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, (2006), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf
(recognizing that, as of 2005, more than half of all state prison and jail inmates symptoms of a mental
health problem).
165
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 353 (citing Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009)).
166
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 (2006).
167
Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 353 (4th Cir. 2021).
168
Specifically, the counties of Augusta, Rockbridge, and Rockingham, and the cities of
Harrisonburg, Lexington, Staunton, and Waynesboro. About SVJC, SHENANDOAH VALLEY JUV. CTR.,
https://www.svjc.org/about-svjc (last visited July 3. 2022).
169
Notable Differences between Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center and Border Facilities,
NEWSRADIO WINA (June 20, 2018), https://wina.com/news/064460-notable-differences-betweenshenandoah-valley-juvenile-center-and-border-facilities.
170
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 341.
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federal laws and regulations, and the ORR[‘s] policies and procedures.”171
SVJC must also provide “appropriate mental health interventions when
necessary.”172
SVJC agreed to be the placement for plaintiff class members knowing
that doing so would subject it to federal standards. Some of the privileges
that federal law grants UACs include being placed with their “best
interests” in mind and in settings that can provide for their “physical and
mental health.”173 When balancing the interests of UACs against those of
the government, courts must take into account that these guarantees are
greater than those provided to other detainees. Concerns regarding
federalism will always be present when applying stricter standards to state
entities, as the Fourth Circuit did in this case by applying the stricter
professional judgment to UACs in place of the more deferential deliberate
indifference standard. Regardless, the federal legislature took care to award
UACs special protections because of their particular vulnerability, a
decision that should not be undone in the name of federalism.
3. The Court’s Role
The dissent expressed concerns that “the majority establishe[d] the
judiciary as the new overseer of mental health care to all detention
facilities.”174 However, by that reasoning, the Supreme Court already
established the judiciary as the overseer of all state facilities or hospitals
that commit individuals for mental health care when it applied the
professional judgment standard in Youngberg. Yet that was neither the
intention nor the practical implication of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Youngberg. The Doe 4 majority made no attempt to increase judicial
involvement in the administration of detention facilities, instead it followed
the Supreme Court’s Youngberg precedent, which required a higher
standard for administering care to detainees that are committed for their
own safety and are receiving treatment,175 rather than detainees in custody
solely for punishment.176 In fact, the Court in Youngberg addressed the Doe
4 dissent’s very concern by iterating that the professional judgment
standard still requires deference to the state’s decisions: “[i]t is not
appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally
171

The majority distinguishes this from ORR’s responsibility to coordinate and implement UAC
care by placing them in facilities that meet appropriate standards, including its own. Id. at 337.
172
Id.
173
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) and § 1232(c)(3)(A).
174
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 348.
175
This can involve those detained for treatment and for the security of themselves and the public,
as was the case in Youngberg. See id. at 340-41.
176
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

265

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

acceptable choices should have been made,” merely whether or not
“professional judgment in fact was exercised.”177 It is the judiciary’s role to
ensure constitutional and statutory protections to rights holders, which is
both what the Supreme Court did in Youngberg, and what the majority did
in Doe 4; it remains the state’s role to implement constitutional standards.
Briefly, it is also worth noting that the dissent is inconsistent in
expressing separation of powers concerns. The dissent accused the majority
of taking too much power from the legislature by considering traumainformed care. This demonstrates a double standard, as the dissent would
limit the judiciary’s role with regards to trauma-informed care, yet inflate
its role by enabling it to disregard how the legislature has already spoken
with regard to the rights and interests of UACs.
C. Impact of the Majority’s Holding
When it comes to the specific impact of this case for the Doe 4
plaintiff class, the Fourth Circuit’s decision will largely depend on remand,
since the majority did not decide whether the professional judgment
standard of care was met in providing the plaintiff class medical care.
Instead, the majority held that summary judgment was improper because
the trial court’s application of the deliberate indifference standard caused it
to exclude key evidence that would be material in the summary judgment
determination.178 It is important not to conflate a finding of legitimate issues
of material fact, which prohibit summary judgment, with a finding that
there was a departure from professional judgment. The dissent suggests that
the majority overstepped its role by “cherry-picking” the facts to reach its
desired conclusion,179 but in a motion for summary judgment the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,180
drawing “all justifiable inferences” in the nonmoving party’s favor.181 By
analyzing the facts in a way most favorable to the plaintiffs (the nonmoving
party for summary judgment), the majority was abiding by the rules of
procedure. The ultimate finding the Court made was that the use of the
deliberate indifference standard precluded potentially material facts from
evidence.182 This created legitimate issues of material fact, making it strictly

177
178
179
180
181
182
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Id. at 321-22.
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 346-47.
Id. at 352.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 346-47.
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within the judiciary’s role to find that summary judgment was not
warranted.183
The Doe 4 majority was careful in coming to its conclusions, limiting
its analysis to a narrow group (UACs), rather than using a broader brush to
consider other child, refugee, or asylum-seeking detainees.184 Still, Doe 4
necessarily carries systemic implications. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that even the professional judgment standard should
give deference to the decisions of professionals within prison
administrations and minimally invade their internal operations.185 Yet in
order for the court or detention facility administrators to ensure that facility
staff adhere to the standards of professional judgment, those standards must
be established in some way. There should be a consistent standard of care
that does not vary wildly across detention center facilities.186 Whether
intentional or not, applying a professional judgment standard demands that
detention facilities increase and maintain their standards of health care in a
way that the deliberate indifference standard would otherwise not.187
Perhaps the Court in Doe 4 went through additional analyses regarding
children188 and trauma-informed care189 for this very reason–to call on the
legislature to address the concerns of unchecked executive definitions of
adequate care, and to supply detailed standards of their own.
III. THE COURT INTENTIONALLY ADDRESSED TRAUMAINFORMED CARE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court spent a portion of its opinion discussing the relevance of
trauma-informed care and how it could relate to professional judgment
regarding adequate mental health care.190 The recent developments in health
care surrounding trauma-informed care provide important context for this
portion of the opinion. From 1995-1997, the Center for Disease Control
183

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 342.
185
See e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607
(1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979).
186
See Lester N. Wright, Health Care in Prison Thirty Years After Estelle v. Gamble, 14 J. CORR.
HEALTH CARE 31, 33 (2008).
187
Since the deliberate indifference standard requires a subjective element, the courts can rely on
this to escape looking at systemic problems with regards to standards of medical care for detainees.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994).
188
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 342.
189
See infra Section III.
190
This discussion was not necessary to the Doe 4’s holding, yet the Court took the time to create
dicta, likely because of the high volume of amici briefs written concerning its opinion by human rights
groups and advocates. See Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 344-46.
184
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conducted a groundbreaking study on the effects of childhood trauma,191
which showed significant links between childhood trauma or “Adverse
Childhood Experiences” (ACEs) and increased risk of death and
delinquency.192 Since this discovery, many have declared trauma to be a
public health crisis, forming the basis for conversations among Congress
and medical professionals about adapted standards of health care for
children.193 Awareness of the public health crisis of trauma caused many
states to respond with initiatives that seek to mitigate the effects of Adverse
Childhood Events and provide support for trauma-survivors.194
A trauma-informed approach, according to the majority, “has three
implications: (1) appropriate [clinical or therapeutic] interventions, (2) a
more global perspective to consider less restrictive alternatives to
detention, and (3) staff rely[ing] less on the use of restraint and
seclusion.”195 The Fourth Circuit defined a trauma-informed system of care
as “‘one that provides an environment in which youth feel safe, are assisted
in coping when past traumatic experiences are triggered, and in which
exposure to potentially retraumatizing reminders or events is reduced.’”196
The majority then discussed several amici submissions and statistics related
to trauma-informed care, including that trauma-informed care “is already in
widespread use in juvenile detention systems and is considered the
accepted standard of professional care.”197 Ultimately, the court did not
determine whether a trauma-informed approach should be incorporated into
the professional judgment standard or not, instead leaving such a

191
See Anda et al., supra note 35; see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra
note 35.
192
See Anda et al., supra note 35.
193
See, e.g., infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
194
For example, Tennessee developed Building Strong Brains, a joint initiative by the legislative,
executive and judiciary bodies to mitigate the impacts of Adverse Childhood Events. NAT’L ACAD. FOR
ST. HEALTH POL’Y, STATE ACTIONS TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES
4 (2021), https://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/NGA_State_Actions_to_Prevent_Miti
gate_ACEs_Dec_2021.pdf. New Jersey created an Office of Resilience, in 2022 with the goal to “1)
Achieve trauma-informed and healing-centered state designation; 2) Conduct an ACEs public
awareness and mobilization campaign; 3) Maintain community-driven policy and funding priorities; 4)
Provide cross-sector ACEs training; and 5) Promote trauma-informed/healing-centered services and
supports.” Id. Delaware implemented an annual survey sent to all state employees regarding traumainformed practices. Id. at 5. To read more about these and other examples, see id.
195
Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 344-45 (internal quotations omitted).
196
Id. at 344.
197
E.g., Brief for Criminal Justice and Disability Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting AppellantPlaintiffs, Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 345 (No. 19-1910). In considering if and how trauma-informed care fits
into a proper professional judgment standard, the Court discussed this and several other amici
submissions. Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 345. The Court also noted that several states have already required
systems of trauma-informed care in their detention facilities.
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determination to the trial court if necessary and perhaps hinting to the
legislature to reach that conclusion.198
The dissent took issue with this discussion of trauma-informed care,
claiming that it is not the judiciary’s role to determine the professional
level of care for mental health.199 While it may not be the judiciary’s role to
define professional judgment in the medical field, it does fall within its
purview to interpret Constitutional amendments in order to give them
meaning within “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.”200 Medical care has been recognized as an especially
quick-moving sector, where the relevant standards change often from one
year to the next.201 As such, the majority appropriately considered the
several amicus briefs it received as relevant to the discussion of how
trauma-informed care might play a role in the current standard for
professional judgment.202
The majority’s deep-dive into the relevance of trauma-informed care
in detention facilities, paired with the court’s ultimate decision not to rule
on the matter of whether it should be incorporated into a standard of
professional judgment, suggests that the Fourth Circuit was making an
effort to signal the legislature to act. Systemic insufficiencies such as the
one suggested by the Fourth Circuit in Doe 4 are best resolved by the
legislature, as courts can, at best, interpret the law in ways most favorable
to vulnerable populations. As previously noted, the professional judgment
standard for medical care is constantly changing as new knowledge comes
to light.203 Thirty years ago, the terrain surrounding mental health and
childhood trauma was very different from today.204 Now that experts have
recognized the profound effects of trauma,205 medical professionals –
including those working in detention facilities – have a responsibility to
incorporate that knowledge into their standard of care.206
198

Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 346.
Id. at 352.
200
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
201
See Wright, supra note 186, at 32 (“the level of health care required, the target for the prison
system, is a shifting target.”).
202
See Doe 4, 985 F.3d at 345-46 (citing various amici submissions discussing the role of traumainformed care and its importance).
203
Wright, supra note 186, See, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. 1; Porter, 974 F.3d 431; Malam, 469 F.
Supp. 3d 767.
204
This is evident from even a cursory glance at state responses to the ACEs study and subsequent
research into how trauma affects the development of children. See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH
POL’Y, supra note 194.
205
Anda et al., supra note 35.
206
Care which does not substantially differ between facilities, or between detainees and free
individuals. See Wright, supra note 186.
199
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Likewise, legislation should reflect the changing understanding of
childhood health. Indeed, several attempts have been made. In 2019, the
RISE from Trauma Act207 was introduced to the Senate; then, in 2020, the
STRONG Support for Children Act208 and the Children’s Protection Act of
2020209 were also introduced. All three bills attempted to proactively
prevent and respond to the effects of childhood trauma, often by funding
programs that provide services to infants, children, youth, and families who
have experienced trauma. The latter two bills were proposed following
congressional hearings on trauma in 2019, where information was
presented showing that “[c]hildhood trauma is a pervasive public health
issue with negative long-term health effects that costs the United States
billions of dollars.”210
The evidence presented during the congressional hearings for these
bills should impact how courts weigh state interests against individual
interests when it comes to trauma. Because of the epidemic nature of
trauma in the United States and the ways it continues to drain state-funded
systems, the judiciary should consider that both the state and individuals
will benefit if trauma is proactively addressed. Indeed, one might argue that
– given how the medical profession has evolved in its understanding of
trauma in the lives of children – it is problematic that other courts apply a
deliberate indifference standard to U.S. citizen children in detention centers
and have failed to apply a stronger standard for their due process
violations.211 While the additional vulnerability of UACs make their case
particularly clear, the judiciary has arguably made it too difficult for other
classes of children to receive adequate care in detention.
IV. THE UNITED STATES HAS RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
Though rarely cited in domestic case law, the United States has
international obligations to various groups both within and outside its
borders. The most common and powerful obligations come from
207

S. 1770, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter RISE Act].
H.R. 8544, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter STRONG Act].
209
H.R. 8565, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter Children’s Protection Act].
210
Identifying, Preventing, and Treating Childhood Trauma: Pervasive Public Health Issue that
Needs Greater Federal Attention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. 1
(2019) (statement of Sen. Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Reform).
211
See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that the deliberate indifference standard is appropriate for constitutional claims from juveniles
in detention centers); A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that
“assessments of juvenile conditions of confinement are necessarily different from those relevant to
assessments of adult conditions of confinement” yet refusing to determine the appropriate standard.)
208
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international agreements the United States has ratified. This is because
ratification binds a State to obey the ratified treaty, making it “party” to the
treaty 212 and subjecting it to international enforcement mechanisms. In
contrast, signing a treaty merely demonstrates support for the treaty and
requires that a State “refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat the
object and the purpose of the treaty.213 Despite its habit of signing
international agreements and rarely ratifying them,214 the United States is
party to a treaty relevant to Doe 4. By ratifying the 1967 Protocol,215 the
United States agreed to abide by Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention.216 Many UACs qualify as asylum-seekers fleeing
persecution.217 The main duty the United States owes to those UACs, then,
is a duty to prevent refoulement.218 In other words, the United States cannot
send refugee or asylum-seeking UACs back to their home states where they
might be subject to persecution. Additional rights may be required by the
Protocol, increasing in proportion with the amount of time a refugee (or
UAC) has been present in the country.219
Beyond the obligations of the United States to UACs as asylumseekers meriting international protection,220 there are several likely
obligations because of UAC’s status as minors. The most widely accepted

212
What Is the Difference between Signing, Ratification and Accession of UN Treaties?, ASKUN
(Mar. 18, 2022), https://ask.un.org/faq/14594 (last visited July 3, 2022).
213
Id.
214
See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, October 5, 1977, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose,
Costa Rica,” June 1, 1977, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Apr. 24, 1970, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311. All are treaties that the United States signed
decades ago but never ratified.
215
1967 Protocol, supra note 74; UNHCR, STATE PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 4, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/
PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf.
216
1967 Protocol, supra note 74.
217
See Terrio, supra note 87; WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, supra note 89.
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1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 73, art. 33.
219
See NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 75.
220
While ORR does not maintain data on the reasons UACs entered the U.S. a 2014 study
conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Office for the United
States and the Caribbean Washington, D.C. revealed that 58% of unaccompanied children who entered
the U.S. from the most common countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico) raised
international protection needs. UNHCR, CHILDREN ON THE RUN (2014), https://www.unhcr.org/
56fc26d27.html. Often this was concluded based on why the children were fleeing their home country:
Forty-eight percent of the displaced children interviewed for this study shared experiences of how
they had been personally affected by the augmented violence in the region by organized armed
criminal actors, including drug cartels and gangs or by State actors. Twenty-one percent of the
children confided that they had survived abuse and violence in their homes by their caretakers.
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source of international law protecting children is the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.221 The United States is the only member of the United
Nations not to have ratified the CRC.222 Despite the fact that the CRC is not
technically binding, it should be persuasive in domestic courts. This
strategy can succeed by calling attention to areas where United States
human rights standards are lower than international standards, and arguing
that the United States should not lag behind the rest of the world in
protecting human rights.223 In fact, courts have readily accepted this
argument in prison cases, using the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,224 the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,225 the
Charter of the United Nations,226 and the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners227 to shape prisoner’s rights within the United
States. Given this history, while not binding law, the CRC could be
persuasive to domestic courts in interpreting and even expanding the rights
of children detained in U.S. facilities.
The CRC recognizes that children “should be fully prepared to live an
individual life in society, and brought up in . . . the spirit of peace, dignity,
tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity,” and that “the child, by reason
221

CRC, supra note 64.
The U.S. did sign the CRC, however, on Feb. 16, 1996. Convention on the Rights of the Child,
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11
&chapter=4&clang=_en (noting all the States who ratified the CRC and their reservations, notably
missing the United States) (last visited July 3, 2022).
223
Connie de la Vega, Using International Human Rights Law in Legal Services Cases, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1242, 1245 (1989).
224
The Oregon Supreme Court cited the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in upholding an
injunction against that pat downs of prisoners’ private areas by guards of the opposite sex. The court
used these international treaties and agreements as examples of principled treatment of prisoners. See
Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 622 n.21 (1981); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
225
See id.; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
226
See supra note 220; U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56.
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In 1980, the District Court of Connecticut court used the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners to help determine what constituted overcrowding in detention. The court noted
that the Standard Minimum Rules were “obligations to the international community of member states of
the United Nations.” Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980). See G.A. Res.
70/175, annex, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Dec. 17, 2015). More recently,
in 2004 the District of Massachusetts noted that “compliance with [the Standard Minimum Rules]
constitutes both relevant practice and evidence of opinio juris.” Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162,
198 (D. Mass. 2004). The court also noted that in 1984, when the Secretary General of the UN made his
first inquiry into the United States’ implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules, 40 states reported
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121/15 (May 31, 1983)).
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of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care,
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.”228
Additionally, the CRC states that children have the right “to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment
of illness and rehabilitation of health.”229 General Comment 24 to the CRC
adds to that language, including a right to the “highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health.”230 These documents are strong support for
the judiciary to apply at minimum the professional judgment standard to the
treatment of any child in detention – not just to UACs. As the Fourth
Circuit stated in Doe 4, both the deliberate indifference and the
professional judgment standard are deferential to the detention facility
administration.231 This substantial deference makes it less likely that
children are provided even an adequate standard of physical and mental
health care, much less “the highest attainable” standard as required by
international law. The CRC also requires that States provide special
protection to more vulnerable groups of children, such as refugees (or
UACs).232 This provides even stronger support for applying a stringent
standard to detention centers’ provision of medical care for UACs. The
principles of the CRC are echoed in various standards promulgated by the
United Nations relating to juvenile detention centers.233
While the professional judgment standard is closer to meeting the
U.S.’s obligations to protect children than the deliberate indifference
standard, both standards likely fail to satisfy international agreements, at
least in their current state. Regarding deference to the state and detention
facilities, the Youngberg court explicitly clarified that while “[c]ourts
228
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Id. art. 24(1).
230
Comm. on Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24 on Children’s Rights in the Child
Justice System, ¶ 82. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/24 (Sept. 18, 2019) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “General
Comment 24”].
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Doe 4 v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 349-55 (4th Cir. 2021). While
the deliberate indifference standard is clearly deferential, courts have consistently discussed how the
professional judgment standard is also deferential. Shaw ex rel. Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135,
1145-46 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that a professional judgment standard, while less deferential than a
deliberate indifference standard, remains deferential to state actors); Yvone L. ex rel. Lewis v. New
Mexico Dep’t. of Hum. Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1992); Montin v. Gibson, 718 F.3d 752,
755 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Pursuant to this test, great deference is owed to the professional judgment of a
qualified professional charged with balancing the plaintiff’s freedom from bodily restraint against the
safety of the public, the plaintiff, and other patients.”).
232
CRC, supra note 64, arts. 20, 22.
233
See G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (The Beijing Rules), ¶¶ 13.5, 19.1, 24.1, 26.2, (Nov. 29, 1985); G.A. Res. 45/113, U.N. Rules
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[must] make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised [i]t is
not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally
acceptable choices should have been made.”234 This suggests that the
judiciary is unable to discuss whether a certain action adequately provided
for a detainee’s needs so long as it arguably meets the undefined standard
of “professional judgment.” This is problematic in the context of children,
especially given the detailed international standards surrounding children in
detention. Since the courts are currently unable to define professional
judgment, or to apply it as international standards would require, the need
for legislative action is obvious.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given both domestic and international precedent and laws, I
recommend that sister circuit courts (and the Supreme Court, if the
opportunity arises) follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead in applying the
professional judgment standard to unaccompanied immigrant children.
International law suggests that such a standard applies to all children in
detention, not just to UACs. This would require courts to revisit previous
case law which failed to discuss the special vulnerability of children and
thus applied the deliberate indifference standard.
As for the legislature and practitioners, the following recommendations may help to address the health crisis of trauma in migrant children:
first, require and develop indicators to assess the realization of children’s
rights (according to both domestic and international law).235 These systems
should ensure that care is similar across facilities.236 Second, work to
eliminate special privileges afforded to unaccompanied migrant children
versus accompanied migrant children, as such discrimination is contrary to
international law237 and the Flores Agreement.238 Third, broaden the scope
of the Child Advocate Program, created under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,239 to apply to unaccompanied
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Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147,
178 (3d. Cir. 1980)).
235
States should not only have established evaluation and monitoring systems in place, but those
systems should be informed by and include input from the children they affect. See General Comment
24, supra note 230, ¶¶ 113-15; see also Byrne, supra note 155, at 76.
236
Wright, supra note 186, at 33.
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See, e.g., CRC, supra note 64, art. 2.
238
The Ninth Circuit ruled that this discrimination was illegal in Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898,
908 (9th Cir. 2016).
239
The program advocates for child welfare, release from detention, where appropriate, and for
family reunification. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-446, 122 Stat. 5044.
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migrant children.240 The Child Advocate Program is guided by the
principles of the CRC, and acts to provide independent child advocates to
migrant children.241 Child advocates provide a voice for migrant children to
ensure their best interests.242 Currently, the program covers children who
are considered “the most vulnerable,” but does not automatically extend to
UACs.243 Extending this program will ensure consent to medical care for
UACs, as lack of consent is currently an issue for this population.244 Lastly
and ideally, the legislature should work to ensure that alternatives to
detention are available and implemented, and that detention conditions for
children meet international standards.245
CONCLUSION
Doe 4 opens a very narrow exception to the low standard of
accountability for detention centers in the United States – one that only
applies to unaccompanied immigrant children being held in detention. This
article recognizes how the judicial standards of review, in their current
state, result in a sort of professional indifference toward children and
vulnerable groups receiving inadequate mental health care while in
detention. Despite this, the Doe 4 holding is important because it is the first
to determine that a migrant child is entitled to heightened protections while
detained, as is the case when a UAC is placed in a secure care facility by
ORR. While this exception will do little to combat the high volume of
improper detentions of immigrant children, it might demonstrate that
domestic courts will be more receptive to broadening protections in the
future. This is certainly required by the CRC and other international
agreements. As the legislature begins to recognize the importance of
trauma-informed care, and courts the importance of heightened
accountability in the U.S. detention system, hopefully momentum will
move the U.S. toward broadening care for all those detained within its
borders, whether in the short or long-term.
Doe 4 is just one case, but the principles it highlights are important –
the guarantees provided by federal statute should not be formalities that are
lost in practice. Vulnerable populations, especially those who are not
240
Malina, supra note 39, at 606 (“Establishing a third party independent of the ORR and facilities
detaining the children, whose sole responsibility is child welfare, seems a reasonable course of
action.”).
241
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242
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detained for the sake of punishment, deserve special consideration and care
in detention. The meaning of Constitutional Amendments will necessarily
change alongside the “evolving standards of decency” as educated by
science, progress and societal shifts – and it should. Children need
protection.
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